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INTRODUCTION: THE SEC AT 75
Barbara Black*
I. INTRODUCTION
The genesis of this symposium topic was, in part, driven by the
calendar-2009 is the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). 1 The choice was also a consequence of
two events that took place in March 2008, just as planning for the 2009
symposium got underway. The Department of the Treasury, under the
leadership of Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., released its
Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (Blueprint)
2
that set forth a series of recommendations designed to remodel the U.S.
financial markets and make them more competitive with foreign
markets. Unfortunately, just a few weeks earlier, the financial markets
experienced the shocking collapse of The Bear Steams Companies, Inc.
(Bear Stearns), one of the nation's largest investment banking firms.3
Although at the time SEC Chair Christopher Cox described the event as
unprecedented,4 Bear Steams turned out to be the first of many large
institutions to fail, in what collectively is described as the 2008 financial
meltdown. These events, and Bernard Madoff's December 2008
confession that he had, for decades, run a $50 billion Ponzi scheme in
plain sight of the SEC,5 shifted the focus of reform from reasserting
* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of
Cincinnati College of Law. The Twenty-Second Annual Symposium, New Models of Regulating the
Financial Markets: The SEC at 75, was held on April 3, 2009. This Introduction bears the date of
November 1, 2009. Jerrod Kuhn, Corporate Law Fellow and University of Cincinnati College of Law
2010, assisted with the research.
1. The SEC assumed responsibility for federal securities regulation in September 1934. JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 107 (3d ed. 2003).
2. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2008).
3. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, SEC's OVERSIGHT OF BEAR
STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 5-6 (2008)
(describing Bear Steams'collapse).
4. Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial
Regulators: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008)
(testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/tsO40308cc.htm.
5. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE
OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME (Public Version) 1 (2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf.
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international dominance to restoring confidence in the integrity of the
system. 6 During this period, many critics faulted the SEC for its failure
of leadership. 7 Moreover, because the financial meltdown knew no
national borders, there was increasing recognition that solutions could
not be simply domestic. Indeed, in April 2009, immediately preceding
this symposium, world leaders at the G-20 Summit debated the creation
of a global regulator whose power would cross national borders to
regulate international financial services firms. 8 After the symposium,
public discussion and debate intensified with the June 2009 release of
the Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory Reform: A New
Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation (Financial
Regulatory Reform). 9  In short, the initial concept-that the SEC's
anniversary would provide a timely opportunity to examine proposals
for regulatory reform-proved to be a good one.
Heeding the advice of Professor James D. Cox, 1° this Introduction
begins with a brief look back at the creation of the SEC and then
examines the present-day agency's expression of its mission. It next
reviews the Blueprint's assessment of the agency and its proposal for
reform and then turns to the Obama Administration's Financial
Regulatory Reform and its proposals relating to the SEC. Finally, this
Introduction describes five issues to which the panelists paid particular
attention: the SEC's mission, competition among financial markets, the
proposal to merge the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), the role of financial market networks in systemic
risk regulation, and the regulation of credit default swaps from an
international perspective. This Introduction concludes by expressing
doubt, based on efforts to date, of achieving meaningful financial
reform.
6. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 2 (2009).
7. Mary Schapiro, at her confirmation hearing to be the new SEC Chair in January 2009,
identified as her top priority to "move aggressively to reinvigorate enforcement at the SEC." Sarah N.
Lynch, SEC Nominee Schapiro Promises to "Reinvigorate " Enforcement, Dow JONES NEWSWIRES, Jan.
15, 2009.
8. See Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, World Leaders Pledge $1.1 Trillion to Tackle Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2009, at A], available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/04/03/world/europe/3sumnmit.htn?-r-=l&scp=1&sq=%22globa %20reguatr/22%20 %22G-
20%20Summit%22&st=cse. The topic for the Twenty Third Annual Symposium, scheduled for March
5, 2010, is The Globalization of Securities Regulation: Competition or Coordination?
9. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 6.
10. James D. Cox, Reinventing the SEC by Staring into Its Past, 78 U Cin. L. Rev. 459 (2009).
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II. THE SEC AS "THE INVESTOR'S ADVOCATE"
The SEC, the self-described Investor's Advocate, "' was created after
a two-year Senate Banking and Currency Committee investigation into
stock exchange practices led by Ferdinand Pecora, the Committee's
counsel. Pecora used the investigation to discredit the laissez-faire
economic policies of the pre-New Deal era by exposing the shady
securities dealings and lucrative financial arrangements of Wall Street. 12
The establishment of an independent agency whose authority was
exclusively securities regulation, however, was an accident resulting in
large part from the New York Stock Exchange's lobbying efforts to
weaken securities legislation' 3 and its fear of the Federal Trade
Commission, on whom the Securities Act of 1933 had conferred
authority. While the Roosevelt Administration resisted industry efforts
to require that at least one SEC commissioner be a stock exchange
member, 4 many reformers found incredible President Roosevelt's
selection of Joseph P. Kennedy, a businessman with a checkered
business background, as the first SEC Chair. 15 The SEC was thus born
in politics, and securities regulation has remained closely linked to
politics ever since.
It is overly cynical, however, to attribute the continual debate over the
SEC's role in financial regulation solely to politics. There is also a
legitimate ongoing debate over the agency's mission. The SEC
consistently states that its mission is "to protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation."' 6  To
this end, it identifies several strategic goals that include enforcing the
federal securities laws, establishing effective regulation of trading
markets and their participants, and facilitating investors' access to
information. 17
11. The phrase is attributed to William Douglas and is posted on the SEC's website. See Mary
Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address to the Council of Institutional Investors (Apr.
6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO40609mls.htm.
12. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1-2.
13. Id. at 97.
14. Id. at 99.
15. Id. at 103.
16. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010). International securities
regulators also include reduction of systemic risk as an objective. See INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS,
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (1998), available at
http://www.riskinstitute.ch/144440.htm (identifying protection of investors, ensuring that markets are
fair, efficient, and transparent, and reduction of systemic risk as objectives).
17. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Draft Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2010-2015, at 4 (Oct.
8, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplanl015.pdf. The identified strategic goals are
2009] 447
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The felicity of the phrasing of this tripartite mission, however, cannot
gloss over its conflicting purposes. 18 Increased corporate disclosure, for
example, may protect investors, but may also increase costs of capital
formation; thus, Congress requires the SEC, in its rulemaking process, to
examine the regulatory burden investor protection may impose on
competition and capital formation. ' 9 Even a hypothetical single purpose
of investor protection presents the question of what investors the agency
should be protecting, because investors are not a monolithic group with
identical interests. Current shareholders in a corporation, for example,
may not want the managers to disclose publicly the corporation's current
financial difficulties because it would result in decreased stock prices
and might further damage the corporation. Potential investors in the
corporation, conversely, want timely, forthright disclosure of all
information material to an assessment of the corporation's prospects.
Thus, appropriate resolution of tensions among investors with different
interests is not straightforward and obvious.
III. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S BLUEPRINT: A DEREGULATORY
APPROACH
The Blueprint's central concern is that the U.S. financial markets have
lost their competitive advantage:
Maturing foreign financial markets and their ability to provide alternate
sources of capital and financial innovation in a more efficient and modern
regulatory system are pressuring the U.S. financial services industry and
its regulatory structure .... Treasury believes it must ensure that the
U.S. regulatory structure does not inhibit the continued growth and
stability of the U.S. financial services industry and the economy as a
whole.
20
Consistent with this approach, the Blueprint identified several critical
deficiencies in the U.S. system of regulation in which separate agencies
regulate across functional lines of financial services such as banking,
insurance, securities, and futures. The current system lacks a single
regulator to monitor systemic risk, creates jurisdictional disputes among
consistent with those set forth in the agency's previous Strategic Plan; see U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
2004-2009 Strategic Plan 3 (Aug. 5, 2004) available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan0409.pdf.
18. 1 have previously questioned whether the SEC's distribution of funds to defrauded investors
is consistent with its mission. See generally Barbara Black, Should the SEC be a Collection Agency for
Defrauded Investors?, 63 Bus. LAW. 317 (2008).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006); see also American Equity Investment Ins. Co. v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, 572 F.3d 923, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (remanding SEC rule to SEC for consideration of its effect
on competition and efficiency).
20. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 2-3.
448
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agencies with respect to new products and services that slow innovation,
and duplicates regulatory activity.
21
The Blueprint sets forth a series of short- and longer-term
recommendations designed to achieve its goal of a more efficient and
competitive regulatory structure. In particular, the Blueprint is critical
of what it describes as the SEC's "rules-based" approach to regulation,
22
which it contrasts with the CFTC's "principles-based" approach.23
Thus, it calls for the eventual merger of the SEC and the CFTC, with
adoption by the combined agency of the CFTC's regulatory
philosophy.24 The Blueprint also proposes greater reliance on industry
self-regulation.25 The Blueprint's vision of the optimal regulatory
structure makes the SEC's diminished role clear; an expanded Federal
Reserve would have authority over market stability and prudential
financial regulation, 26 and business conduct regulation and corporate
disclosure, parts of the core SEC mission, would be divided between
two weaker agencies.27
While the Blueprint is a product of the prevailing deregulatory
philosophy prior to the 2008 financial meltdown, two of its goals-the
need for a systemic regulator and the harmonization of financial
regulation-remain central goals of the Obama Administration's reform
agenda. The latter, however, shifts the emphasis from avoiding
duplication to closing regulatory loopholes.
IV. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:
A NEW FOUNDATION?
After the shocking and profoundly unsettling financial collapse of
2008, restoring confidence in the financial system needed to become the
focus of regulatory reform. 28  Accordingly, although the Financial
Regulatory Reform makes many of the same recommendations as the
Blueprint, consumer and investor protection replace competitive
advantage as the dominant message:
21. Id. at 4-5.
22. See id. at 11-12.
23. See id. at 12. For an astute analysis debunking the rules-based vs. principles-based
dichotomy, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of "Principles-Based
Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007).
24. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 11-12.
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 15-19.
27. Id. at 19-21.
28. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 6, at 2.
2009] 449
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We must build a new foundation for financial regulation and supervision
that is simpler and more effectively enforced, that protects consumers and
investors, that rewards innovation and that is able to adapt and evolve
with changes in the financial market. 29
Consistent with that theme, the Financial Regulatory Reform sets
forth five key objectives: 30
1. Promote robust supervision and regulation offinancial firms. The
Federal Reserve would supervise all financial institutions whose failure
poses a threat to financial stability; a new Financial Services Oversight
Council would improve agency coordination; and the SEC would have
authority to require registration of hedge funds and other private pools
of capital. 3
2. Establish comprehensive supervision of financial markets.
Regulatory agencies would have increased authority to regulate
securitization markets, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and credit
rating agencies and would harmonize the regulation of securities and
futures.
3 2
3. Protect consumers and investors from financial abuse. A new
independent agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency
(CFPA), would protect consumers of financial products and services
from unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices.33
4. Provide government with tools it needs to manage financial crisis.
The Federal Reserve would have new authority to deal with failing
institutions.34
5. Raise international regulatory standards and improve international
cooperation. The focus would be on international consensus on core
issues, such as regulatory capital standards, oversight of global financial
markets, supervision of internationally active financial firms, and crisis
prevention and management.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 3-4.
31. Id. at 3, 5-6, 10-13, 19-42.
32. Id. at 3, 6-7, 13-14, 43-54.
33. Id. at 3, 7-8, 14-16, 55-75.
34. Id. at 4, 8, 16, 76-79.
35. Id. at 4, 8-9, 16-18, 80-88.
450
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The Financial Regulatory Reform is, at its core, a minimalist plan
that, with few exceptions, does not propose radical change. While the
proposed CFPA is an innovative proposal and the Financial Regulatory
Reform's linchpin for consumer protection, it is under heavy attack from
business groups 36  and may not be enacted. 37  Like the Bush
Administration's Blueprint, the Obama Administration's plan
contemplates that the Federal Reserve-which, under the leadership of
its previous Chair, Alan Greenspan, relied on market discipline to curb
excesses 38-will become the primary systemic risk regulator.39  In
addition, a Financial Services Oversight Council would, with some
additional powers, replace the President's Working Group on Financial
Markets to provide coordination and counsel.40 Rather than merging the
SEC and CFTC, the Financial Regulatory Plan calls for harmonizing
futures and securities regulation through the agencies' mutual
agreement; contrary to the Blueprint's endorsement of the CFTC's
principles-based regulatory approach, it calls for the two agencies to
"build a common foundation for market regulation ... on principles of
regulation that are significantly more precise than the CEA's current
'core principles. ' ' 41
The Financial Regulatory Reform also recommends some
enhancements of existing SEC authority: it would require hedge funds
and other private pools of capital to register with the SEC;42 the SEC
and CFTC would regulate OTC derivatives; 43 additional investor
protections would be adopted, including a fiduciary duty standard for
broker-dealers that offer personalized advice to retail investors;44and the
SEC's sanctions power would be increased.45 In turn, the SEC has
36. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce leads the opposition with a $2 million advertising
campaign. Brody Mullins, Chamber Ad Campaign Targets Consumer Agency, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 8,
2009, at A4; Stop the CFPA, http://stopthecfpa.com/ (sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
37. However, the House Financial Services Committee, by a 39-29 vote, approved legislation
that would establish the CFPA on October 22, 2009. Press Release, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Financial
Services Committee Votes to Create the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Oct. 22, 2009),
available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs dem/pressCFPA_1 02209.shtml.
38. Greenspan has confessed error. See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators:
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (testimony of Dr. Alan
Greenspan), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20081023100438.pdf.
39. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 6, at 3-4.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 50 (emphasis added); see also infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 37.
43. Id. at 46-47.
44. Id. at 70-72.
45. Id. at 72.
2009]
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committed to do better in the future.46 Unfortunately, this is an SEC
commitment that follows every regulatory failure and does not inspire
much confidence.47
V. SYMPOSIUM PANELISTS
The 2009 securities law symposium came at a significant crossroads
for financial regulation. Not only was there a transition between
administrations with contrary philosophies, but also the financial crisis
of 2008 highlighted the need for change. The symposium panelists
addressed, in particular, five important issues in the debate over
financial reform.
A. The SEC's Mission
In his article, Professor James D. Cox observes that the SEC has
survived because its broad rulemaking authority permits flexibility and
adaptability, and investor protection is a largely noncontroversial
mission.48 Thus, he argues that the agency should avoid politically
charged issues on the periphery of its core mission and return to industry
and market practices-issues the agency was primarily created to
address. As Professor Cox points out, an SEC study of financial
services firms in the post-Gramm-Leach-Bliley era might have alerted
the agency to their precarious highly leveraged financial condition.49
Finally, he asserts that what the agency needs is not new laws, but
renewed commitment to its mission. 5
0
B. Competition Among Financial Markets
Does the Blueprint's focus on restoring the dominance of the U.S.
financial markets have any staying power after the 2008 financial
meltdown? Professor Adam C. Pritchard, in a provocative article,
argues that neither New York nor London will prevail in the current
regulatory environment. 51 London ascended over New York in the
46. See Lynch, supra note 7.
47. See generally Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FtN.
& COM. L. 303 (2008) (assessing the SEC's performance in response to the conflicted research and
mutual fund scandals).
48. Cox, supra note 10, at 461.
49. Id. at 463.
50. Id.
51. Adam C. Pritchard, London as Delaware?, 78 U. Cin L. Rev. 473 (2009).
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competition for listings because it offered significant advantages in the
post-Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) era; liquidity and a light regulatory touch
proved more attractive than any "bonding" premium provided by
SOX.
5 2
The United Kingdom's response to the 2008 financial meltdown,
however, has mirrored that of the United States; it too "succumbed to
populist backlash. 53 Thus, tightened limits on leverage for institutions
deemed "too big to fail" create opportunities for hedge funds and other
firms that do not need the backing of a lender of last resort and for
jurisdictions that will commit to less regulation. 54 Moreover, the value
of exchange listings has plummeted because of technologies in
trading.55 Accordingly, Professor Pritchard concludes, neither New
York nor London is likely to provide an important listing advantage in
the future.
C. SEC-CFTC Merger
Both Professor Roberta S. Karmel, a former SEC commissioner, and
Professor Jerry W. Markham, a former CFTC attorney, believe that an
SEC-CFTC merger warrants further study, although both recognize that
political pressures defeated previous efforts.56 Apart from that common
ground, their views diverge greatly.
Professor Karmel characterizes the Blueprint as a "highly political
document" reflecting the Bush Administration's ideology of
deregulation. 57 Nevertheless, she argues for serious reconsideration of
an SEC-CFTC merger.58 The longstanding turf battles between the SEC
and the CFTC, with the Federal Reserve playing an active role on behalf
of banks, distracted the agencies from their regulatory purpose.59
Although there were plenty of warning signs about the dangers of
excessive securities credit and poor regulation of OTC derivatives, none
of the three regulators took any action. 60 An SEC-CFTC merger would
lead to better regulation of the markets, she argues, because (1) it would
52. Id. at 488.
53. Id. at 490.
54. Id. At 495.
55. Id. At 498.
56. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of the Securities and Exchange Commission as a Market
Regulator, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 501 (2009); Jerry W.Markham, Merging the SEC and the CFTC-A Clash
of Cultures, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 537 (2009).
57. Karmel, supra note 56, at 504.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 517.
2009]
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end counterproductive jurisdictional squabbling and allow the agency to
focus on what regulation is in the public interest, (2) it would produce a
bigger, and presumably more prestigious, powerful, and independent
agency, and (3) the SEC needs to be reenergized and reinvigorated. 61
The final consideration is especially important because the SEC has a
huge agenda: securities credit needs to be curtailed, broker-dealer capital
adequacy rules need to be revised, OTC derivatives require regulation, a
new short sale rule should be considered, hedge fund managers should
be required to register as investment advisers, and investment adviser
regulation should be improved.62
Professor Markham, in contrast, finds that the Blueprint provides a
reasoned approach to regulation that remains relevant in addressing the
failures of the current regulatory structure.63 He argues that regulatory
reform is needed to address the existing haphazard, ineffective, and
punitive regulatory approaches taken by both agencies. An SEC-CFTC
merger will only be effective, however, if the new regulator operates
under a principles-based regulatory system-a cultural change that
would be difficult for the SEC to accept. Specifically, the agencies have
different regulatory approaches toward floor traders, suitability rules,
margin requirements, insider trading, customer account insurance, and
short sales.
64
As discussed previously, the Financial Regulatory Reform abandons
the Blueprint's proposal to merge the SEC and the CFTC and instead
speaks of "harmoniz[ing]" their regulation. 65 It calls on the agencies to
identify their differences and either explain why they are "essential to
achieve underlying policy objectives" or recommend changes.66 In
response, the SEC and CFTC issued a joint report on October 16, 2009,
highlighting the agencies' fundamental differences and outlining efforts
to increase regulatory harmonization.67 The report details the evolution
of the CFTC and the negative effect that the introduction and complexity
of derivative financial products had on jurisdictional issues between the
two agencies.68  Thus, the report recommends a series of moderate
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Markham, supra note 56, at 552.
64. Id.
65. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 6, at 43.
66. Id. at 50-51.
67. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, A JOINT
REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION (2009), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/opacftc-
secfinaijointreport 01 .pdf.
68. Id. at 2.
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reforms to align more closely the SEC and CFTC. Specifically, the
report suggests legislation establishing a more precise and efficient
method of reviewing jurisdictional questions between the agencies,
69
calls for several joint programs to fill the loopholes that permeate the
current regulatory framework, 70 and urges uniformity in standards for
various players in the financial sector to alleviate confusion in the
industry.7'
D. Financial Market Networks
Professor Olufunmilayo B. Arewa discusses financial market
networks and argues for greater recognition of the threats they pose to
systemic risk.72 The credit crisis illuminated regulators' inability to
keep up with changes in the financial markets, such as electronic
trading, product innovation, and proprietary trading, that led to greater
linkages across markets and products and, as a result, caused a cascading
effect across markets.73
She recommends that regulatory reform consider to a greater extent
the implications of market activities and trading practices for systemic
risk and create regulatory structures that promote creation of incentives
for individual market participants to better manage risk. This approach
will require significant changes by Congress (away from fundamental
regulation) and significant changes in risk assessment and management
by both regulators and market participants. In addition, there must be
mechanisms to better monitor regulators' effectiveness.
74
E. SEC Regulation of Credit Default Swaps: An International
Perspective
Professor Janis Sarra looks at the regulation of derivatives,
specifically credit default swaps, from an international perspective.75
69. Id. at 87.
70. Id. at 93, 94.
71. See, e.g., id. at 90 (uniform fiduciary standards for all parties providing investment advisory
services); id. at 90 (uniform record retention requirements); id. at 90-91 (uniform customer risk
disclosure documents); id. at 91 (uniform private fund reporting requirements); id. at 92 (uniform
authority for enforcement of aiding and abetting violations).
72. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Financial Markets and Networks: Implications for Financial
Market Regulation, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 613 (2009).
73. Id. at 623.
74. Id. at 627.
75. Janis Sarra, Financial Market Destabilization and the Role of Credit Default Swaps: An
International Perspective on the SEC's Role Going Forward, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 629 (2009).
2009] 455
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She addresses the need to build greater international consensus on how
to encourage the positive risk management aspects of derivatives, while
slowing the speculative aspects that create transactional and systemic
risk.7 6 While the SEC's role in regulating OTC credit default swaps is
currently limited to antifraud enforcement, its potential role includes
transparency initiatives, regulatory oversight, rigorous enforcement, and
encouragement of new governance norms. In short, there are many
issues the agency must consider moving forward."
VI. CONCLUSION
As these descriptions make clear, the panelists offered diverse views
on the appropriate regulatory role for the SEC of the future. At the time
of this Introduction, there is reason to doubt whether the 2008 financial
meltdown will result in major regulatory reform. First, as noted
previously, the goals of the Financial Regulatory Reform are modest.
The proposal itself acknowledges that more could be done, but asserts it
is focusing on the essential, "to address the causes of the current crisis,
to create a more stable financial system that is fair for consumers, and to
help prevent and contain potential crises in the future., 78  To be sure,
reform measures that offer a reasonable possibility of meeting these
goals would be a worthy accomplishment.
Second, as the shock and panic of the 2008 financial meltdown recede
from memory, the opportunity to use public indignation to drive change
diminishes. While public outrage toward Wall Street remains strong,
reflected principally in the outrage over executive bonuses, 79 to date, no
76. Id. at 639-40.
77. The House Financial Services Committee voted, by a 43-26 margin, to regulate OTC
derivatives. Under the bill, all standardized swap transactions between dealers and large market
participants would have to be cleared and must be traded on an exchange or electronic platform. The
legislation sets forth parallel regulatory frameworks for the regulation of swap markets, dealers, and
major swap participants. Rulemaking authority is held jointly by the CFTC (swaps) and the SEC
(security-based swaps). The Treasury Department has authority to issue final rules if the agencies
cannot agree. See Press Release, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Financial Services Committee Approves
Legislation to Regulate Derivatives (Oct. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs-dem/pressder_101509.shtml. The financial services
industry has spent over $220 million in 2009 on lobbying efforts; see DealBook, House Panel Votes to
Regulate Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 15, 2009, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/house-
panel-votes-to-regulate-otc-derivatives/?scp=2&sq=derivatives%20regulation%201obbying&st=cse.
78. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 6, at 4.
79. Treasury and the Federal Reserve have taken steps to curb executive compensation in
response to public indignation. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, The Special Master for
TARP Executive Compensation Issues First Rulings (Oct. 22, 2009), available at
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present-day Ferdinand Pecora has stepped forward to use this sentiment
to lead the effort for significant reform.
Accordingly, rebuilding confidence in the financial markets may
depend on renewed efforts by the SEC to protect investors. This recalls
Ferdinand Pecora's prediction to President Roosevelt about the
Securities Exchange Act: "It will be a good or bad law depending upon
the men [sic] who administer it." 80
press/bcreg/20091022a.htm.
80. SELIGMAN, supra note I, at 100.
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